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NOTES AND COMMENTS
stage. The Supreme Court has clarified the law; the problem now
rests, in each case, with the triers of the facts.
Shannon Jones, Jr.
STATE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE
H. P. HOOD & SONS V. DU MOND
A RECENT case on the question of state regulation of or con-
cerning interstate commerce is that of H. P. Hood & Sons
v. Du Mond, Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets of the
State of New York decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States April 4, 1949. The issue in this case concerned the consti-
tutionality of a New York statute which authorized the State Com-
missioner of Agriculture and Markets to refuse the issuance of
a license for the operation of receiving stations to receive milk
upon findings that the issuance of such a license would not be in
the public interest and would tend to create destructive competi-
tion in a market already served. The statute further provided
".... that the applicant be qualified by character, experience, fi-
nancial responsibility and equipment to properly conduct the pro-
posed business."2 It was conceded that the applicant for a license,
Hood and Sons, had met the latter requirements. The commis-
sioner refused to grant the license on the sole ground that its
issuance would be adverse to the public interest and create de-
structive competition. Interstate commerce was clearly involved
in the case in that all milk collected in applicant's three existing
receiving stations in the state was exported to a sister state, Massa.
chusetts, and it was applicant's intention to so export milk col-
lected at the proposed receiving station. Other facts established
that the State of New York had long been part of the milkshed
1336 U. S. 525 (1949).
2 New York Laws 1934, Art. 21, § 258c.
1949]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
of Boston and that during the last ten years the consumption of
Boston had not varied 8% in relation to the New York milkshed.
There was also evidence of a previous shortage of milk in Troy,
New York, which was in close proximity to the proposed receiv-
ing station. In denying the application for a license the commis-
sioner was of the opinion that the producers in the area were
already adequately served, and that there was no indication that
such producers would receive a higher price for their milk from
the applicant than they already were receiving. Moreover, the
commissioner believed the proposed receiving station would re-
duce the quantity of milk going to the other receivers in the area,
increase their handling costs, and tend to divert milk from Troy.
From the above facts the commissioner concluded that the issu-
ance of the license would not be in the public interest and would
tend to lead toward destructive competition. This denial was held
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States under
the above related facts on the ground that a state may not regulate
to further its own local economic advantage and well-being at the
expense of curtailing the volume of interstate commerce. Some
question is raised as to whether this case fits into the scheme of
cases that have been decided in the past. Mr. Justice Black, in a
dissenting opinion clearly did not think so.
State regulation statutes involving interstate commerce will nor-
mally be controlled by two general propositions. The first is that the
state may not regulate when the thing sought to be regulated is
national in scope requiring uniformity of regulation.' In such an
instance the subject matter lends itself only to national regula.
tion. The regulation sought to be enforced in this case does not
come under this heading by reason of the fact that the milk indus-
try does not lend itself to national uniformity of regulation
because of local geographical conditions in each state, and even
in different counties of the state.' The second proposition is that
the state may regulate, in the absence of conflicting federal regu-
3 Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100 (1890).
4 Hood v. DuMond, 336 U. S. 525 at 529 (1949).
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lation, if the interstate activity sought to be regulated requires
diversity of regulation among the various states and the regula-
tion does not place an undue burden on interstate commerce.' The
milk industry falls within this classification by reason of its local
diversity and the extensive climatic and geographical conditions
under which it operates and is affected so substantially.' There-
fore, the State of New York would be permitted to regulate in
this instance if its regulation did not unduly interfere with or
burden interstate commerce. The founders of the Constitution in
conferring the power over interstate commerce to the Congress
of the United States intended purposely to protect and promote
interstate commerce by precluding the states from interfering
with the freedom of such commerce through the creation of eco-
nomic barriers at their borders or the enacting of other dis-
criminatory or burdensome regulations in pursuance of their re-
served powers. The courts, in upholding the intention of the
founding fathers, have used the words undue burden,' economic
barrier,' direct burden,9 and discrimination 0 to strike down state
statutes that have been devised for the states own economic ad-
vantage or placed such a restriction on interstate commerce that
it could not effectively continue. However, if the state exercises
its reserved power in a legitimate mqnner to protect a local inter-
est that would be considered of greater importance than the com-
plete free flow of interstate commerce and the benefits to be derived
therefrom, then such a reasonable state regulation would be up-
held." In such a case the court, after weighing all the facts in
Cooley v. Port Wardens of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299 (1851).
a This second proposition was established first in Cooley v. Port Wardens of Phila-
delphia, ibid. There was some conflict in the early cases prior to this decision as to
whether the regulation of interstate commerce was exclusively in the federal govern-
ment. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat 1 (1824) had indicated
that it was exclusive.
Milk Control Board of Penn. v. Eisenberg, 306 U. S. 346 (1939).
s Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511 (1935).
" Seaboard Airline R. Co. v. Blackwell, 244 U. S. 310 (1917).
10 South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177 (1938).
11 Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761, 768, 769 (1940). Dowling, Interstate
Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REv, 1 (1940).
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the case, determines that the public interest of the state viewed
through the state statute is greater than the complete free flow of
interstate commerce, and holds such a statute constitutional. The
state in the exercise of its police power may then impose restraints
upon interstate commerce to protect certain of its interests. For
example, state quarantine laws have been held constitutional even
though such laws often preclude commerce by prohibiting the
introduction into the state of diseased stock or plants. 2 Also, state
laws regulating the speed of trains and auto carriers and regula-
tions in the latter case as to maximum loads, width and height
for vehicles on public highways have been sustained in the inter-
est of safety to the state citizens.'" The sale of colored oleomar-
garine in the original package has been prevented by the state to
protect its citizens from fraud. 4 Nevertheless a state may not pro-
mote its own economic interest by limiting interstate trade. For
example, in the motor vehicle cases requiring interstate truck and
bus lines to obtain a public certificate of convenience and necessity
before operating on the state's highways the court has repeatedly
held that such statutes violate the commerce clause when the pur-
pose behind the statute has been to limit competition within the
state. 5 The court said that the purpose of such a statute is not
to regulate the manner of the use of the highway, which is constitu-
tional, but rather to designate who will use them, thus preventing
competition for the state's own local economic advantage.
In the milk control cases the same principle is applied. While
price fixing statutes setting maximum and minimum prices have
been much litigated they have generally been upheld as not violat-
ing the due process clause of the constitution.' If the due process
12 Smith v. St. Louis & S. W. R. Co., 181 U. S. 248 (1901). Ashell v. State of Kansas,
209 U. S. 251 (1908).
1 Seaboard Airline R. Co. v. Blackwell, 244 U. S. 310 (1917); Michigan Pub.
Utilities Comm. v. Duke, 266 U. S. 570 (1925).
14 Plumly v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461 (1894) ; Sage Stoves Co. v. Kansas, 323
U. S. 32 (1944).
15 Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307 (1925).
16 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
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clause has not been violated then the question may be presented as
to whether the state regulation abridges the commerc clause. Bald-
win v. G. A. Seelig involved a New York statute that required the
payment of minimum prices to the producers of milk destined for
sale in the state. 7 Plaintiff in the case had been importing milk
from Vermont and sold the substantial part of it in the original
case in which he received milk and bottled the remainder for sale
to consumers. The court held in this case that the statute was uncon-
stitutional, stating that the original package was only a convenient
test and not conclusive, and further that when a statute in effect
or in fact raised an economic barrier at the state border then
such a statute was unconstitutional. According to the court no
health or safety consideration entered into the purpose for which
the statute was passed. The court went on to say that an economic
barrier cannot be raised through the states' taxing or police power
when there are no health or safety considerations present. The
statute in the case was to exclude milk from without the state and
in practical effect would permit the producers in the State of New
York to expand at the expense of foreign producers. This was
exactly what our forefathers intended to prevent through the com-
position of the interstate commerce clause.
Mr. Justice Jackson points out that Hood v. Du Mond"8 is the
converse of the Baldwin case. In one, the state statute was designed
to prevent the shipment of milk from being exported out of the
state, while in the other the aim was to prevent the shipment of
milk from being imported. Essentially the purpose of the statutes
in both cases was to prevent destructive competition within the
state. However, the Supreme Court has not as yet held in any case
that destructive competition alone is enough without other safety
or health considerations present to bring such statutes in con-
formity with the commerce clause.19
17 294 U. S. 511 (1935).
18 336 U. S. 525 (1949).
19 Justice Black's dissenting opinion gives the impression that he considers the prob-
ability of destructive competition enough to sustain the New York Statute.
1949]
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Another case in point on the same question was Milk Control
Board of Pennsylvania v. Eisenberg Farm Products."0 Here the
statute required a minimum price to be paid to all producers, but
unlike the Baldwin case the statute purported to cover only the
producers in the State of Pennsylvania and not outlying states.
It was also required that the producers keep certain records and
to be licensed. The petitioner in the case sold milk in interstate
commerce and the Supreme Court held that the statute was con-
stitutional. An important fact in this case was that less than 10%
of the milk produced was destined for shipment in interstate
commerce. The statute was held constitutional in that the effect
on interstate commerce was incidental, and that the purpose behind
such legislation was to assure the public a competent and sanitary
handler of milk and the producer a fair price. As brought out by
the majority opinion, the Hood case went beyond the Eisenberg
case, and actually the question involved started where the Eisen-
berg case left off. The Pennsylvania act did not purport to curtail
the volume of interstate commerce to aid state interests. In the
Hood case the receiver had met all the sanitary requirements and
had posted bond to assure that the producer would get prompt
payment. That portion of the statute had been met and was not
involved in the case. With respect to compliance with the remainder
of the statute which required a showing of public interest and no
creation of destructive competition in order to permit a granting
of the license Mr. Justice Jackson said:
"It is only additional restrictions, imposed for the avowed purpose
and with the practical effect of curtailing the volume of interstate
commerce to aid local economic interests, that are in question
here, and no such measures were attempted or such ends sought to
be served in the Act before the Court in the Eisenberg case."'21
From the above cases it appears that the Hood case is consistent
with the previous cases decided by the Supreme Court and that the
law today is that a state may not regulate for its own economic
20306 U. S. 346 (1939).
21 336 U. S. 525 at 530-31.
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